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Chapter 1
Breaking through the crisis with decentralisation? 
Collective bargaining in the EU aft er the great recession
Roberto Pedersini and Salvo Leonardi
1. Setting the scene
The debate about industrial relations developments in Europe in recent years has 
focused on the multiple impact of the crisis (¿ nancial, economic and ¿ scal) and of 
policy and regulatory reforms promoted by European economic governance, the so-
called Troika, and national governments (Marginson 2014; Marginson and Welz 
2014; Papadakis and Ghellab 2014; Schulten and Müller 2015; Koukiadaki et al. 2016; 
Guardiancich and Molina 2017). Against this background, the diɣ erent developments 
that have characterised national industrial relations systems entail a number of tasks, 
not only at the academic level, but also at the operational or practical level. First of 
all, it is important to improve our knowledge of the diɣ erent national trajectories 
and analyse evidence in a comparative perspective. There is remarkable potential 
here for cross-national fertilisation and strategic learning; these are key components 
of both scholarship and social partner initiatives in labour relations. Secondly, such 
knowledge and analyses can contribute to strengthen forms and tools of cooperation 
and coordination at European level, which trade unions at both national and European 
level have been promoting for many years.
In order to pursue these objectives, a number of trade union–related research institutes 
and academic departments initiated the DECOBA project, funded by the European 
Commission. The DECOBA project, in particular, aims to:
– analyse the ongoing shift from centrally coordinated multi-employer collective 
bargaining to decentralised negotiations in a number of EU Member States where 
the former has traditionally been strong (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Spain); 
– tackle the issue of how company-level bargaining can, in a changing environment, 
play a new, useful role in establishing working conditions, without paving the way 
for social dumping and wider inequalities;
– promote greater expertise and awareness, especially among the social partners, 
about such crucial developments and issues.
In previous studies, some of the DECOBA partners have stigmatised the negative 
implications of mainstream economic theory that regards wages as merely a cost factor 
and its policy implications in terms of adjustment and internal devaluation, which are 
part of ‘the strange triumph of failed ideas’, as Paul Krugman puts it (2010; see also 
Lehndorɣ  2012, 2015). In a number of other European studies (CAWIE, GOCOBA), a 
diɣ erent view and narrative was put forward, arguing that the competitiveness crisis 
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in countries such as the southern European Member States was not due to high wage 
levels and labour market ‘rigidities’, but to elements of non-price competitiveness (¿ rm 
size, infrastructure, shadow economy, ¿ nancial speculation). Alternative strategies 
were identi¿ ed, aiming at inclusive and wage-driven growth, based on the assumption 
that ‘Europe needs an inclusive growth strategy that focuses on reducing inequality 
and enhancing real income growth … Restoring and supporting collective bargaining 
on wages is de¿ ned as a key factor in this strategy’ (Van Gyes and Schulten 2015: 409). 
Wage increases should be welcomed in order to support private demand and wage-led 
growth, which is still by far the most important macroeconomic factor in most euro-
zone countries (Onaran and Obst 2016).
The DECOBA project was launched to update these analyses with new facts and 
developments in the early post-crisis phase and it goes beyond a merely descriptive 
approach. From this point of view, our key issue is to verify the conditions under 
which European industrial relations are entering the post-austerity phase, now that 
European and international institutions have given signals of a new era by recognising 
the shortcomings and failures of the austerity approach. The OECD and the IMF have 
reconsidered the eɣ ectiveness of austerity policies and have rede¿ ned their analyses 
with much more attention to (in)equality, the growth potential of wages and the bene¿ ts 
of coordinated bargaining (OECD 2012; IMF 2016). In a similar vein, the Juncker 
Commission has proposed the ‘European Pillar of Social Rights’, while ECB President 
Draghi admitted the importance of countering underemployment and increasing wages 
for boosting consumption and GDP, echoing some of the main points of the ETUC 
campaign for a ‘pay rise’ all over Europe.
What is the current state of industrial relations in the European Union, after what has 
been described as a ‘frontal assault on multi-employer bargaining’ (Marginson 2014)? 
Were multi-employer collective bargaining institutions indeed compromised or are they 
still solid? Which processes were initiated during the crisis and the adjustment phase 
and which trajectories can we identify for the future? Can the new policy climate ¿ nd 
fertile ground for con¿ rming industrial relations as a key component of the European 
model?
In order to respond to these questions, we focus on the transformations of recent 
years, notably in 2012–2017. But we broaden our perspective to include, on one side, 
the trajectories that the countries under review were following before the crisis and to 
assess, on the other, the eɣ ects of institutional change on industrial relations processes 
and outcomes. In this sense, we consider not only the revision of rules, but also the 
impact of reforms on practice, which crucially depends on the responses and strategies 
developed by social partners, in a changing economic and institutional environment. 
Domestic elements and especially the agency of national actors have in fact remained 
relatively unexplored. Here, we want to analyse both the external and internal drivers of 
adjustments in industrial relations and highlight the role played by the diɣ erent actors, 
namely national governments, trade unions and employers’ associations.
By taking advantage of the longer span of time, we can obtain new insights about 
current developments in collective bargaining and industrial relations. Of course, 
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we are analysing an ongoing process and it is diɤ  cult to extrapolate future trends. 
However, we can better focus on the state of play and emerging patterns. Moreover, we 
believe that the inclusion of agency adds substantially to the explanatory power of the 
analytical framework and provides a better understanding of what might be inÀ uencing 
the prospects of national industrial relations systems, in a combination of continuity 
and change.
In this general picture, economic and institutional (regulatory) factors are strictly 
intertwined and it is often diɤ  cult to identify their respective roles. The ¿ nancial 
crisis led to pervasive liquidity problems, a credit crunch and increased bankruptcies; 
the economic crisis involved declining demand, widespread reorganisation and 
restructuring processes, as well as rising unemployment; and the ¿ scal crisis hardened 
public budget constraints and, besides inducing a retrenchment of public expenditure, 
often led to public sector job and wage cuts.
Policy and regulatory reforms were often intended to respond to the challenges posed 
by the manifold crisis, which clearly did not hit all EU countries in the same way. 
External pressures exerted by European Economic Governance and the Troika had 
quite diɣ erent degrees of force and involved distinct tools and implications for the target 
countries, basically depending on the presence and severity of imbalances and their 
contingent situations. Indeed, if the incisiveness of external intervention has sometimes 
been very important, this was basically in response to internal problems. Whereas the 
speci¿ c recipes and recommendations can be criticised for their social impacts and 
ineɣ ectiveness, and possibly better measures could be adopted, the relevance of the 
problems they wanted to address – public debt crisis or bailouts in the ¿ nancial sector 
– must be acknowledged.
In sum, the basic descriptive question we want to address is whether, during the period 
under analysis, there was a change in collective bargaining structures. More precisely, 
we want to assess whether the crisis can be regarded as a turning or a break point, 
whereby national industrial relations systems have been diverted from their previous 
trajectory to follow a new path, or at least existing trends have been accelerated to the 
extent that the fundamental features of collective bargaining structures have eɣ ectively 
changed. From the analytical point of view, we want to identify the main drivers that can 
explain the pattern we observe, be it continuity or change. In this respect, as mentioned 
above, the main variables we use are economic conditions, public ¿ nances, external 
policy pressures and domestic agency in the political, economic and industrial relations 
domains – that is, what governments, enterprises and social partners did to tackle the 
crisis itself or the growing external pressures.
Our analysis is based on ¿ ve in-depth cases presented in the following chapters. They 
cover a fairly diverse set of industrial relations systems, as well as diɣ erent situations, as 
far as the other variables under consideration are concerned. The case studies provide up-
to-date and extensive information on industrial relations developments in the economy 
as a whole and in two distinct sectors: metalworking and retail trade. Examining this 
large evidence base allows us to respond to the ¿ rst descriptive question, whereas 
for the explanation of the diɣ erences across countries, we propose an interpretative 
Roberto Pedersini and Salvo Leonardi
10  Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries
framework. The use of a case-study analysis provides some important insights into 
the processes shaping change in collective bargaining and industrial relations, but 
the complex web of causation and correlation needs to be further explored. However, 
it would be diɤ  cult to study transformations of a mostly qualitative nature by using 
other methods, considering that proper quantitative data on these phenomena (that is 
consisting of ‘measures’ rather than ‘scores’) are often missing.
Despite important diɣ erences, all the national industrial systems covered by this study 
share two basic features, which make them particularly relevant for our investigation of 
the transformation of the collective bargaining structure:
(i)  the traditional pivotal role of sectoral bargaining;
(ii)  the multi-tier bargaining system, which includes second-level negotiations, mostly 
at company level (with the peculiarities of the German case concerning the role 
of works councils, see below), but to a certain extent at territorial level too. More 
variation exists in terms of the extent and relevance of inter-sectoral bargaining, 
but, with the exception of Germany, this level plays a signi¿ cant role everywhere.
By looking at changes in these characteristics, we can see whether the balance point 
of collective bargaining is moving downward and whether multi-employer bargaining 
remains the most important steering factor in the system overall.
2.  Deﬁ nition of variables
Analysing bargaining structures is a complex exercise, especially in multi-tier systems. 
While it can be relatively simple to identify the most important bargaining level, 
assessing the relative importance of other levels may not be so straightforward. This 
implies not only the consideration of rules on prerogatives, priorities and coordination 
across diɣ erent levels, but also of the eɣ ective relevance of the provisions de¿ ned at 
the various levels. This involves both a qualitative assessment of the importance of the 
diɣ erent levels (by looking, for instance, at the scope of the various agreements) and a 
quantitative analysis, which can focus on the relative coverage of the distinct levels. The 
latter consideration points to a more fundamental issue: if we concentrate on collective 
bargaining institutions, we may overlook the shrinking of collective bargaining coverage 
overall. If ‘disorganised decentralisation’ brings the collective bargaining system closer 
to market regulation, the reduction in the coverage of collective bargaining – which we 
may call ‘decollectivisation’ – goes even more clearly in the same direction.
Therefore, in order to analyse the state and transformations of collective bargaining, we 
will look at the following features:
– the coordination of collective bargaining by assessing the degree of vertical 
coordination (organised/disorganised bargaining) and horizontal coordination 
(unitary/segmented bargaining) and by establishing whether coordination is 
the result of internal processes governed by the bargaining parties or of external 
intervention by the state and government (autonomous/dependent coordination);
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– the coverage of collective bargaining (high/low) provides an indication of the 
eɣ ectiveness of collective regulation of employment relations at various levels;
– the quality of collective bargaining (core/framework/implementation provisions) is 
related to its incisiveness in determining actual employment and working conditions 
by both central/sectoral and decentralised agreements.
To some extent, these dimensions may be considered a selection of the classic variables 
proposed by Hugh Clegg in Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining (1976). 
Clegg spoke of the extent of collective bargaining, as the proportion of employees 
covered by agreements, and of the degree of control and the scope of bargaining, as 
the capacity, respectively, to set and enforce obligatory standards and to regulate a 
broad range of aspects (Clegg 1976: 8–9). As we are focusing on multi-tier bargaining 
systems, some adaptations are needed, because the issues of vertical coordination and 
of the quantitative and qualitative relevance of the diɣ erent negotiation levels become 
particularly important.
2.1 Bargaining structure and coordination
Coordination is often regarded as the key feature of the collective bargaining 
structure. It has replaced the role that centralisation formerly played in the analysis 
of neocorporatism in the 1970s and 1980s, in order to take into consideration 
both the reality of multi-tier bargaining systems and the growing importance of 
decentralised bargaining (Traxler 1995; Traxler et al. 1997). For our purposes, it is 
important to distinguish between diɣ erent kinds of coordination mechanism, which 
impinge on diɣ erent characteristics of the bargaining system. First, we can identify 
vertical coordination between bargaining levels, so that the relative prerogatives and 
competencies of the various points of negotiation are clearly established in order to 
reduce the scope for overlap and replications. Second, horizontal coordination across 
bargaining units ensures an even development in the main elements of negotiation, such 
as wages or the bargaining structure itself, and can promote the diɣ usion of the results 
achieved in certain areas to other segments of the economy. Third, we can distinguish 
between internal and external coordination, since coordination can be the result of 
rules or practices autonomously produced by the social partners or it can derive from 
constraints imposed and provisions enacted by the political authorities. These diɣ erent 
forms of coordination can be linked to three important features of collective bargaining 
systems: whether it involves organised or disorganised decentralisation within a multi-
employer bargaining framework; whether the bargaining system is unitary (inclusive) 
or segmented; and whether it is autonomous or dependent on state intervention.
Due to the variety of market situations and organisational patterns across diɣ erent 
sectors, it is essential to limit the focus of horizontal coordination to wage developments, 
on one side, and the rules governing bargaining itself, on the other. Although 
traditionally only wage-setting is considered in this kind of analysis (Visser 2013), 
the inclusion of this second element allows us to check for the existence of multiple 
bargaining structures within a single economy, instead of assuming that each country 
embraces a unitary system. A further element of horizontal segmentation may be linked 
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to the proliferation of ¿ rst-level (typically sectoral) bargaining units, usually due to the 
establishment of new employer associations for existing or emerging sectors. If the 
new bargaining units adopt the prevalent bargaining structure and are covered by the 
existing peak-level organisations, the impact on horizontal coordination may be trivial. 
By contrast, if they create separate bargaining systems, then horizontal coordination 
may be jeopardised. Turning to vertical coordination, it is useful to broaden our attention 
to include at least the main conditions of employment, such as wages, working time and 
work organisation, in order to better grasp the relations between and relative scope 
of the various bargaining levels. In fact, in many cases, the scope of wage À exibility at 
lower bargaining levels can be limited, especially downwards, whereas other important 
elements of employment can be broadly determined through decentralised agreements.
There are a number of connections between types of coordination and the means and 
processes by which it can be achieved (Traxler et al. 2001; Traxler 2003; Traxler and 
Brandl 2012; Visser 2013: 54–61). For instance, the introduction of binding statutory 
wage ceilings and À oors promotes horizontal coordination and imply a lower level of 
autonomy on the part of the bargaining system; the presence of pattern bargaining 
essentially promotes horizontal coordination between bargaining units. However, the 
introduction of statutory or collectively agreed rules can ensure both horizontal and 
vertical coordination: a national wage norm steers pay rises across sectors, whereas 
the favourability principle aɣ ects relations between bargaining levels. Similarly, 
organisational action by the unions and/or the employers can contribute to coordination 
across bargaining units and between bargaining levels.
Table 1 presents the main coordination patterns, reÀ ecting horizontal and vertical 
coordination. Centralised bargaining systems, by de¿ nition, involve high scores on 
both dimensions, essentially because the exclusivity or even merely the prevalence of 
one encompassing central bargaining level resolves the issue of coordination. Where 
sectoral bargaining prevails and company or local agreements are possible, as in 
the national cases under investigation here, it is no longer possible to disregard the 
coordination problem.
Table 1 Main coordination patterns
Horizontal coordination
High Low
Vertical 
coordination
High
Organised 
bargaining
Segmented 
bargaining
Low
Decentralised 
bargaining
Disorganised 
bargaining
Source: Authors’ design.
In such a situation, the bargaining structure can replicate the ‘coherence’ automatically 
enforced by centralised systems only if it can ensure high horizontal and vertical 
coordination. This is the case of organised bargaining, with regard to which centralisation 
is only one possibility. The opposite condition of symmetrically low coordination on 
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both dimensions identi¿ es disorganised bargaining, thereby reproducing the basic 
distinction between organised and disorganised decentralisation introduced by Traxler 
(1995). However, our scheme takes into consideration two intermediate positions: 
segmented bargaining between vertically organised separate bargaining units and 
decentralised bargaining, which enhances the autonomy of second-level agreements, 
but maintains overall horizontal coordination across the whole economy. Although, at 
¿ rst sight, this may seem an implausible combination, it could depict a radical shift to 
company-level bargaining, coupled with the implementation of a legally enforced wage 
norm. Moreover, it is important to recall that we are now looking only at the institutional 
features of the bargaining system; we will discuss its eɣ ectiveness in the section on 
coverage. This means that decentralised bargaining without signi¿ cant coverage of 
decentralised agreements could well amount to the demise of the bargaining system 
altogether.
The factors that can inÀ uence horizontal coordination include the presence of an 
intersectoral bargaining level, the force and role of peak organisations on both sides 
of industry; the practice of pattern bargaining; and legal provisions that enforce 
wage À oors and wage ceilings or wage norms. Similarly, vertical coordination can 
be promoted by prerogatives and priorities established in both collective agreements 
(as in the opening-clause system in Germany) and legislation (for instance, by de¿ ning 
a favourability principle, which ensures that decentralised deals can only improve 
on conditions established in higher levels, as in the case of Belgium). Typically, legal 
provisions inÀ uencing the degree of horizontal coordination help to enhance it by 
implementing general standards in terms of wage developments or other working 
conditions. On the contrary, the eɣ ect on vertical coordination critically depends on the 
content of the norms, which may support both organised and disorganised bargaining 
systems.
We now turn to our national cases and identify their speci¿ c features as regards 
bargaining coordination. Despite their common features – that is, the pivotal role of 
sectoral bargaining and the presence of diɣ erent bargaining levels – their collective 
bargaining institutions diɣ er substantially and the changes introduced in recent years 
point to diɣ erent trajectories. Detailed descriptions of national bargaining systems and 
their recent reforms can be found in the individual chapters in this volume. Here, we 
provide a brief overview and interpretation, in accordance with the analytical framework 
presented in this chapter.
Belgium is usually described as a highly institutionalised and centralised system. Some 
of its basic features are con¿ rmed by the current analysis. However, the emerging picture 
is slightly more diversi¿ ed. Horizontal coordination is ensured by both legislative 
provisions, notably the introduction of a statutory ceiling for wage increases in order to 
maintain competitiveness (already in 1996), and by the indexation mechanisms, which 
are universally present in collective agreements, although they operate according to two 
distinct mechanisms in the diɣ erent sectors (see the chapter on Belgium for details). A 
further element of coordination derives from intersectoral bargaining, which determines 
the norm of wage increases across the economy, which is supposed to be added to the 
indexation factor. In terms of vertical coordination, a strict favourability principle 
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applies, so that decentralised bargaining can only enhance economic and normative 
provisions, as well as protections. Some limited variation in the structure of collective 
bargaining can be found across sectors, essentially concerning the relative importance 
of sectoral agreements as opposed to company bargaining. In certain industries, sectoral 
bargaining tends to determine only a general framework, whereas the most important 
provisions are set at company level. This happens for instance in the chemical and 
banking sectors, while in steel and paper company agreements are prevalent, due to the 
presence of a small number of very large enterprises. Such variance, however, remains 
in the collective bargaining system, legally regulated at central level since 1968.
A number of changes have aɣ ected the Belgian collective bargaining structure in 
recent years – including an increase in the importance of regional social dialogue – 
especially with regard to policymaking. However, focusing on the bargaining system 
in the private sector, the most important changes concern the government’s renewed 
activism, imposing wage moderation by enacting strict statutory wage norms. Such 
interventions in 2011–2016 did not aɣ ect the established bargaining structure, which 
remained organised, but have reduced bargaining autonomy. This state of aɣ airs 
was institutionalised with a reform of the wage-setting system in March 2017, which 
reduces social partners’ autonomy and increases government inÀ uence (see the chapter 
on Belgium). Interestingly, the autonomy that the social partners have lost at the 
intersectoral level has been reinstated at the decentralised level. In order to recover at 
least partly the leeway they lost at central level, the social partners have enhanced the 
role of decentralised negotiations, thereby stressing the potential of decentralisation 
in a system that remains protected by a fairly strict favourability principle. Referring 
to the distinction between opening clauses, which empower decentralised bargaining, 
and opt-out clauses, which enable derogations (Marginson and Welz 2014:, 8), we can 
say that the Belgian example seems to point to a proactive response by social partners. 
They were able to preserve their autonomy in ways that correspond to the government 
objective of promoting the diɣ usion of gain-sharing at company level. In sum, we can 
say that nowadays Belgium has a system of organised bargaining with less social partner 
autonomy in wage setting at central level, but potentially more scope for supplementary 
decentralised bargaining.
France has a similarly highly institutionalised system, whose main governing factor is 
national legislation. The presence of extensive regulations on mandatory negotiations 
at national and decentralised level since the 1982 Auroux laws; widespread use of the 
extension of multi-employer agreements; regulation of representativeness; provisions 
on workplace representation structures; and the presence of a legal minimum wage 
contribute to de¿ ne a framework strongly inÀ uenced by government action. Such 
characterisation is further strengthened by the provisions on mandatory social dialogue 
at national level, enacted in 2007 under Jacques Chirac and reinforced later under 
both Sarkozy and Hollande, as well as by the traditional role played by a statutory 
favourability principle. The lack of intersectoral wage bargaining and of an economy-
wide wage norm indicate that horizontal coordination may be less eɣ ectively ensured in 
France than in Belgium. However, the role played by the minimum legal wage (SMIC) 
can be regarded as similar. We therefore consider France to be a second example of 
organised bargaining.
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Recent reforms have not aɣ ected horizontal coordination nor the general 
institutionalisation of industrial relations. Rather, they have focused on vertical 
coordination and have tried to increase decentralised bargaining autonomy by loosening 
the favourability principle in certain areas. The most recent ordonnances signed by 
President Macron on 22 September 2017 continued along these lines by identifying a 
limited set of issues – for instance, minimum wage rates, job classi¿ cation systems, 
equality between women and men, training – which are reserved for sectoral agreements 
and to which the favourability principle will continue to apply, and a second group of 
topics which sectoral agreements may decide to exclude from possible derogations at 
decentralised level. On all other issues, decentralised agreements can now introduce 
provisions that are independent and potentially derogate from existing sectoral rules. 
Certainly, to achieve this result a majority company-level agreement is needed, because 
with no agreement the sectoral deal remains in force. However, especially if a company 
runs into economic diɤ  culties or is under threat of delocalisation, the new institutional 
setting seems to provide grounds for more concession bargaining. In SMEs, in 
particular, where no trade union is present, the agreement may now be concluded by 
elected employees who are not mandated/appointed by unions and in micro ¿ rms the 
employer initiatives may be sanctioned by an employer-initiated employee referendum. 
In larger enterprises, the employer continues to need the unions’ agreement and this 
may provide some leverage for their demands, too. The general trend in rules seems 
therefore to be moving France towards decentralised bargaining, in which horizontal 
coordination will remain mostly dependent on the SMIC. Beyond the new rules, vertical 
coordination will rest mainly upon trade union strength at decentralised level, based on 
the broad entitlements assigned by legislation, the mandatory nature of negotiations 
and the presence of a now unitary employee representation structure in which they are 
predominant. However, it is worth mentioning that such developments may weaken 
the overall relevance of multi-employer bargaining, which would critically depend on 
the continuity of the extension of sectoral bargaining. Otherwise, the risk of moving to 
single-employer bargaining may soon emerge.
Germany has long been regarded as the exemplary case of coordinated bargaining. 
In this traditional picture, on one hand, horizontal coordination is ensured by pattern 
bargaining, often led by the strong metalworking union IG Metall. On the other hand, 
vertical coordination is supported by granting exclusive bargaining rights to trade 
unions, which operate mainly at sectoral level. In workplaces, the codetermination 
rights entrusted to works councils represent an important balance for management 
prerogatives in employment-relevant issues. Works councils and management can 
conclude so-called works agreements, which de facto represent a second bargaining 
level, although they are not seen as collective agreements in the strict sense, as 
they can only supplement sectoral collective agreements and have to comply with 
the favourability principle. Trade unions are not formally involved, although they 
eɣ ectively play a substantial part in works councils, since many councillors are in fact 
trade unionists, especially in larger companies. Legislation on employee representation 
in the supervisory boards of large companies contributes to de¿ ne an overall picture 
of worker participation and provides further leverage for coordination in a broader 
sense. The inclusion of opening clauses in sectoral agreements, which started as early 
as the 1960s, con¿ rms the capacity of the industrial relations system to combine some 
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degree of decentralisation with continued control by industry-wide agreements. In fact, 
the opening-clause system gained momentum in the 1980s–1990s and soon became a 
reference for organised decentralisation.
The analysis presented in this volume points to a signi¿ cantly diɣ erent state of 
industrial relations in 2017. In terms of horizontal coordination, pattern bargaining 
probably plays a less prominent role than in the past. In fact, it may well have lost its 
pivotal position in the German industrial relations system. A possible new candidate 
for horizontal coordination might be the legal minimum wage introduced as recently 
as January 2015. However, it remains to be seen to what extent the development of the 
minimum wage will inÀ uence collective bargaining. So far, it only has inÀ uence on a 
few collective agreements in low pay sectors. By contrast, minimum wage adjustment 
largely follows the development of collectively agreed wages. In fact, the Minimum 
Wage Commission, which is made up of employers and trade union representatives, 
in preparing its biennial recommendations on adjustment to the minimum wage level, 
is also supposed to consider developments in collectively agreed wages (Amlinger et
al. 2016). But if coordination now rests at least partly on the legal minimum wage, the 
nature of coordination has somehow changed. While pattern bargaining could play 
a progressive role in speci¿ c bargaining rounds, the legal minimum wage essentially 
provides for rather modest protection and ensures – by de¿ nition – minimum pay 
development.
Turning to vertical coordination, the expansion and recon¿ guration of the opening-
clause system in recent years has, on one side, reduced its original exceptional nature 
and, on the other side, con¿ rmed a fairly developed management procedure that 
ensures trade union inÀ uence on the process overall. For instance, in the case of the 
metalworking sector, the Pforzheim Agreement of 2004 introduced a general opening 
clause, but, at the same time, it enabled the institutionalisation and regulation of 
the derogation procedure, thereby resolving the problem of earlier disorganised 
decentralisation. As a consequence of such a regulatory setting, with some sectoral 
speci¿ cities (see the German chapter for a comparison between the metalworking, 
chemicals and retail sectors), the once quite separate roles of trade unions and works 
councils have somehow become closer, since the implementation of opening clauses 
involves the two actors in the same processes with shared responsibilities. Overall, it is 
possible to con¿ rm the institutional framework as supporting bargaining coordination, 
at least in manufacturing. However, there is a growing role of legal intervention due 
to the decline of collective bargaining coverage, which was not the case in the past. 
Indeed, the reinforced possibility to extend sectoral collective agreements introduced 
by legislation (Schulten 2018), as well as the legal minimum wage signal somewhat 
less autonomy on the part of the industrial relations system, while promoting a re-
strengthening of the bargaining system and its coordination capacities, as traditional 
supportive measures used to do.
Until the 1990s, Italy was, alongside the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries, 
a typical case of voluntarism, with a minor role for statutory regulations, apart from 
a number of important provisions promoting trade union action established by the 
Workers’ Statute of May 1970. Similarly to the German case, horizontal coordination 
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was promoted by the leading role played by the metalworking sector through pattern 
bargaining and, at certain junctures, by public employers in the large segment of 
state-owned enterprises, which was also important in the French case. The relevance 
of the major trade union confederations (CGIL, CISL and UIL) and employers’ peak 
association (Con¿ ndustria) provided an encompassing framework for industrial 
relations, which helped diɣ use practices across sectors. Moreover, the presence 
of an indexation mechanism, designed in a way that had a strong equalising impact 
on wage diɣ erentials in the high-inÀ ation years of the early 1980s, represented an 
important factor in economy-wide wage coordination. There were no strong or legal 
rules for vertical coordination, but the clear predominant role played by the industry-
wide agreements, as well as the union capacity to extend their action to workplaces 
signi¿ cantly reduced the autonomy of decentralised bargaining, whereas it allowed 
forms of micro-concertation (Regini 1995). 
The institutional picture changed in the early 1990s as new rules for horizontal and 
vertical coordination were enacted. In the ¿ rst direction, the monetary policy tool of 
planned inÀ ation was the key income-policy indicator and provided the yardstick for 
wage increases in all sectors, with the objective of preserving the purchasing power of 
pay. In the other direction, the second level of negotiation specialised in gain sharing, 
so that duplication of norms was ruled out and a speci¿ c prerogative on performance-
related pay was recognised with regard to decentralised deals. Consequently, Italy 
entered the 1990s with an organised bargaining system, which put it alongside Germany 
and other continental European countries (Pedersini 2014).
A series of intersectoral agreements after 2009 introduced some adjustments, but 
did not modify the basic features of the system. Forecast inÀ ation has become the 
main reference for periodic wage increases at the sectoral level (in some cases, the 
reference is ex-post inÀ ation, see the chapter on Italy for details), thereby con¿ rming 
the specialisation of industry-wide agreements in preserving the purchasing power 
of pay. The scope for decentralised bargaining has increased somewhat, and the 
opening-clause system has been introduced, with the de¿ nition of speci¿ c rules on the 
eɣ ectiveness of agreements, in order to take into account the presence of a plurality of 
unions within workplaces, which may not sign all deals jointly. In particular, since 2011 
a number of intersectoral agreements signed by CGIL, CISL and UIL, together with 
Con¿ ndustria have introduced a minimum representativeness threshold of 5 per cent 
for participating in sectoral negotiations and have endorsed a majority principle for the 
validity of agreements at all levels. Through these provisions, coordinated bargaining 
has been preserved.
However, a new provision was introduced in the Italian legal system in the summer 
of 2011, which enables decentralised agreements to derogate extensively from sectoral 
collective agreements and, to a certain extent, even from legislation. According to 
Article 8 of Decree Law 138/2001, derogatory agreements can be linked to a large 
number of objectives: increasing employment, enhancing the quality of employment 
contracts, promoting employee participation, ¿ ghting undeclared work, improving 
competitiveness and wages, managing industrial reorganisation and restructuring, 
supporting investment and the start of new economic initiatives. Derogations can 
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similarly cover a wide range of topics, including working time, the introduction of new 
technologies, work organisation, job classi¿ cation and tasks, non-standard contracts, 
hiring procedures and the consequences of terminating the employment relationship. 
Moreover, horizontal coordination has been threatened by the emergence of new 
bargaining units, which may be either inside or outside the traditional perimeter of 
intersectoral relations between the major industrial relations actors. Notably, this 
happened with the exit of the Fiat Group from Federmeccanica, Con¿ ndustria’s 
aɤ  liated metalworking employer association, and the creation of a new, separate 
collective bargaining system. The increasing number of industry-wide agreements in 
recent years, with new signatory employer associations, and the splits opening up in 
some employer associations are going in the same direction. In general, the overall 
regulatory framework remains attached to the model of coordinated bargaining, 
but it now includes some elements of both decentralised bargaining and segmented 
bargaining, which may erode and disorganise the system.
Spain, like the other countries examined here, entered the ¿ nancial and economic crisis 
with a substantially coordinated bargaining system, anchored to centralised agreements 
setting guidelines and wage norms, widespread use of indexation mechanisms in 
collective agreements, as well as a predominant role for sectoral bargaining, usually 
at provincial level. Measures unilaterally enacted by the government during the crisis 
introduced some signi¿ cant changes, in three instances between 2010 and 2012. Major 
changes were enacted with the 2011 and 2012 reforms.
In June 2011 the socialist government introduced measures aimed at favouring 
decentralised bargaining. The new legislation suppressed the possibility to establish 
by agreement the complementarity of the various bargaining levels, whereby higher 
levels can restrict the scope of decentralised deals by stating that lower levels cannot 
regulate what is already regulated at higher levels. In addition, it provided for the 
priority of decentralised agreements on a number of key issues, such as basic wages and 
supplements, overtime and shift bonuses, working time and job classi¿ cation systems. 
However, this legal priority was balanced by the possibility of sectoral agreements to 
establish coordination rules and exclude certain topics from the negotiation entitlements 
of decentralised bargaining.
The conservative government’s reform of 2012 proceeded further along the path of 
strengthening decentralisation. First, temporary derogations from sectoral agreements 
became easier, as the reasons allowing them were broadened and the number of items 
that could be derogated expanded. Second, the eɣ ectiveness of collective agreements 
was limited to only one year after their deadlines. Previously, expired agreements 
continued to be valid inde¿ nitely, until they were renegotiated. With the 2012 reform, 
expired agreements remain eɣ ective for only one year after expiry, which puts pressure 
on unions. In fact, unions now have to negotiate under the threat of losing collective 
bargaining coverage if the negotiations for renewal last more than one year. Third and 
most importantly, the clause allowing sectoral agreements to regulate the bargaining 
structure and exclude some issues from decentralised agreements was suppressed, 
thereby making decentralised bargaining a general and non-suppressible regulatory 
tool with regard to the key topics of collective bargaining mentioned above. Finally, 
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employer prerogatives for unilateral internal À exibility were reinforced. Employers 
can now introduce substantial changes in working conditions if they are not regulated 
by mandatory collective bargaining agreements, concerning the following issues: (i) 
working day; (ii) working time and distribution of working time; (iii) shift work regimes; 
(iv) system of remuneration and wage levels; (v) work performance; and (vi) tasks.
In terms of the vertical relationship between the various negotiation levels, such changes 
have clearly shifted the institutional balance of the bargaining system to an overly 
decentralised bargaining setting, with fairly broad scope, which does not include for 
instance the reservation of some basic elements to sectoral agreements, as in the French 
case. Moreover, the new rules undermine the eɣ ectiveness of horizontal coordination in 
wage bargaining allowed by indexation mechanisms and guidelines set in higher-level 
agreements. Therefore, the Spanish bargaining system appears to represent a case of 
decentralised bargaining, potentially prone to a shift to disorganised bargaining.
2.2  Bargaining coverage
Having analysed the changes in bargaining institutions, we can now turn to consider 
the relative coverage rates of both sectoral/central agreements and decentralised 
ones. Because we are studying multi-tier bargaining systems, which were traditionally 
centred around industry-wide agreements, the impact of the possible shift to lower-
level agreements must be assessed against their eɣ ective diɣ usion.
As we have seen, in Belgium the bargaining structure has not undergone radical changes 
in recent years and is still characterised by high horizontal and vertical coordination. 
Unilateral intervention by the government in wage-setting, however, has decreased the 
autonomy of the bargaining system. The lower scope for wage bargaining at sectoral 
level has triggered some readjustment in the balance between bargaining levels, so that 
the relevance of decentralised agreements increased somewhat, but still in a closely 
coordinated setting. In terms of coverage, sectoral agreements continue to cover almost 
the whole workforce (90 per cent or more), thanks to the joint committee system and 
extensions, although no data are available on the coverage of decentralised agreements. 
However, there are indications of increased use of second-level deals. This rise is 
related mainly to the use of company settlements on variable pay as complementary 
or alternative to the (imposed) wage moderation or freezes at central level. Between 
2009 and 2015 the percentage of the total wages coming from this bonus system rose to 
almost 1 per cent (based, among other things, on 1,917 company agreements).
In contrast to Belgium, in France changes in bargaining structure have been important, 
amounting to an institutional drift to decentralised bargaining. Concerning coverage, 
sectoral agreements still inÀ uence the employment terms and conditions of almost 
the whole workforce (90 per cent or more), as in Belgium. Decentralised company 
agreements have become progressively more important since the early 1980s, not only 
because of their entitlements, as indicated above, but also in numerical terms. In fact, 
coordination ensured by the favourability principle was soon coupled with competition 
in rule setting between the sectoral and company levels (Morin 1996). This was also 
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because employers could exploit their increased bargaining power at company level (see 
the chapter on France). The number of company deals progressively increased from 
relatively low levels in the early 1980s (3,900 in 1984) until the end of the 1990s, when 
they peaked in connection with the implementation of the Aubry laws on the 35-hour 
week. After falling again until 2003, their number started to grow and reached almost 
40,000 in 2013, above the peak of the year 2000. In 2014 and 2015, the number of 
company deals was stable at around 37,000.
In France, company level collective bargaining follows a cycle inÀ uenced by mandatory 
negotiations on diɣ erent topics, which do not take place at the same time, but in periodic 
rounds. Nevertheless, they have involved a fairly stable share of the workforce in recent 
years. In 2015, for instance, agreements were reached in 15 per cent of workplaces with 
more than 10 employees and covered 61.5 per cent of the respective workforce. Existing 
data do not allow us to identify any impact of the measures which provided more scope 
for derogations at company level, also due to the short time passed since the introduction 
of the latest measures. However, previous interventions in the same direction did not 
show a very high take-up rate. An early reform in 2004 allowed company agreements 
to derogate sectoral standards on all matters except basic wage rates, job classi¿ cation, 
vocational training and supplementary social protection. At the same time, legislation 
allowed sectoral agreements to regulate or even rule out this option and indeed most 
industry-wide deals used this possibility and enforced a strict hierarchy between levels, 
with sectoral provisions prevailing. Similarly, a temporary derogation of sectoral 
standards agreed in the national inter-sectoral agreement (ANI) on competitiveness 
and job security signed in 2013 during the Hollande presidency was used in only ten 
agreements. Despite this current state of aɣ airs, it must be recognised that the formal 
and real importance of company bargaining certainly provides a solid basis for making 
the institutional shift to decentralisation without strong vertical coordination eɣ ective, 
as allowed by the latest Macron ordonnances.
Table 2 Collective bargaining coverage: sectoral and decentralised agreements, 
 2015–2016 (% of employees)
Sectoral coverage Decentralised coverage
Belgium  ≥90%  (No data)
France  ≥90%  61.5%*
Germany  48%  30%**–17%***
Italy  90%  34%
Spain  65–70%  5%
Note: * Percentage share of the workforce in enterprises with at least 10 employees. ** Workers covered by collective 
agreements and a works council. *** This corresponds to 35 per cent of all workers covered by collective agreements.
Source: DECOBA.
In Germany, the erosion of the overall bargaining coverage rate is a key feature of recent 
developments, although it represents a medium- to long-term trend, which started at 
least in the mid-1990s. When we analyse trends in coverage rates in Germany, besides 
looking at the role of industry-wide agreements, it is possible to consider, on one side, 
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single-employer bargaining as an alternative to industry-wide agreements and, on the 
other, the diɣ usion of second-level deals within the framework set by industry-wide 
accords. In practice, the decentralisation of the bargaining structure may take place 
both with a shift to single-employer bargaining and by growing utilisation of opening 
clauses through the conclusion of derogation agreements.
The general trend shows that the coverage of sectoral agreements has progressively 
decreased in the past 20 years. In 1998, coverage was 68 per cent in western Germany 
and 52 per cent in the east. By 2016, it had decreased to 51 per cent and 36 per cent, 
respectively, amounting to overall coverage of 48 per cent. As for company agreements, 
they remained stable over this period. In 1998 and 2016 alike, they covered 8 per cent 
of workers in western Germany and 11 per cent of workers in the east, and 8 per cent 
altogether.
Companies covered by sectoral agreements may also conclude works agreements 
between the works council and the management, which can be considered a form of 
second-level bargaining. However, in the German context these works agreements are 
not seen as collective agreements in the strict sense, as they could only cover issues in 
addition to collective agreements and have to adhere to the favourability principle. All 
in all, around 30 per cent of all workers in Germany are covered by both a collective 
agreement and a works council.
While the German system has always been characterised by sectoral collective 
agreements and (supplementary) works agreements, the debate on decentralisation 
of collective bargaining has focused almost exclusively on so-called ‘derogation 
agreements’. The latter are based on opening clauses in sectoral collective agreements 
that allow (temporary) derogation from collectively agreed industry-wide standards at 
company level. In contrast to regular works agreements, derogation agreements are 
concluded mainly by the responsible trade union rather than by the works council. 
According to survey data, in 2011 some 20 per cent of companies covered by collective 
agreements used opening clauses. These companies employ around 35 per cent of all 
workers covered by collective agreements, which corresponds to about 17 per cent of all 
workers in Germany.
Another source con¿ rms the same proportion of companies using opening clauses in 
2015 (21 per cent) and signals that a further 13 per cent of companies are implementing 
‘informal derogations’ outside the framework of opening clauses. The fact that use 
of opening clauses is not linked to economic and ¿ nancial performance is a further 
indication of its importance. In fact, opening clauses do not seem to be an exceptional 
feature of workplace joint regulation, unlike when ‘hardship clauses’ were originally 
included in sectoral agreements to face temporary diɤ  culties. They appear to be rather 
a structural tool. Today, they are still formally temporary, but tend to be regularly 
renegotiated to accompany ¿ rms’ business strategies.
A further aspect worth considering in the case of Germany are diɣ erentials in the 
sectoral coverage of industry-wide agreements. They can be observed thanks to recent 
data provided by the German Statistical Oɤ  ce, based on the German Structure of 
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Earnings Survey (SES). This survey generally indicates lower coverage rates than the 
traditional source (see the German chapter for a discussion of the two sources), but 
the information about the relative sectoral coverage rates provides important insights. 
While in 2014 coverage was above-average in a number of traditional manufacturing 
sectors, ¿ nancial services, energy and public administration, it was signi¿ cantly lower 
in certain services and in agriculture and somewhat lower in electronic, food industry 
and retail trade.
By combining the data on institutional change and on bargaining coverage, we 
see that some sectors (mainly in manufacturing) seem characterised by organised 
decentralisation, but others (mainly services) show more evidence of de-collectivisation 
and erosion. The lack of a link between derogations and the enterprise’s economic and 
¿ nancial situation, as well as the non-trivial diɣ usion of ‘informal derogations’ suggest 
some limitations in enforcement of the regulatory framework that lays down the 
conditions for derogations. This does not necessarily mean that organisational control 
over the process is weak. In fact, while the procedures involving the various actors and 
stakeholders in the activation and implementation of opening clauses may be followed 
strictly, the capacity to inÀ uence the ¿ nal outcome may still be weakened.
In Italy, the coverage rates of industry-wide agreements have been high and substantially 
stable in recent years. It is estimated that some 80 per cent of the overall workforce are 
covered by sectoral deals (Visser 2016). Recent ISTAT data on the earnings structure 
even indicate that collectively agreed wage rates are applied to almost all employees. In 
fact, more than 90 per cent of enterprises with 10 employees or above apply industry-
wide deals to their whole workforce consistently across sectors (CNEL-ISTAT 2016: 
105–106). Conversely, only a minority of employees are aɣ ected by decentralised 
bargaining. The same ISTAT data show that some 20 per cent of companies with at 
least 10 employees are covered by decentralised collective agreements, including both 
company and territorial accords (CNEL-ISTAT 2016: 109).
In particular, company agreements are signed in 12.9 per cent of enterprises with at 
least 10 employees and the propensity to conclude company deals is strictly related to 
size. Coverage involves 8.8 per cent of enterprises with between 10 and 49 employees, 
31.9 per cent of those with 50–199 employees, 56.6 per cent of those employing between 
200 and 499 employees and 65.5 per cent of the larger ones (Fondazione Di Vittorio 
2016: 2). The type of economic activity inÀ uences the incidence of company agreements. 
In manufacturing and construction, some 25 per cent of companies with 10 employees 
or above are covered by decentralised agreements. Due to the particular features of the 
two sectors, the majority of enterprises in manufacturing are covered by company deals 
(17.9 per cent), whereas in the construction sector the main decentralised level is the 
territory (20.4 per cent). Service companies show a second-level collective bargaining 
coverage below 20 per cent, with a prevalence of company deals (Fondazione Di Vittorio 
2016: 4).
If we move from the percentage of companies covered to coverage in terms of employees, 
it has been estimated that company agreements aɣ ect some 27 per cent of the total private 
sector workforce, including micro-¿ rms below 10 employees and excluding agriculture 
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and household workers. At sectoral level, this goes from 39 per cent in manufacturing 
to 25 per cent in business services, 18 per cent in personal services and 5 per cent in 
construction. In construction, most decentralised deals are concluded at territorial 
level, which add a further estimated coverage of 20 per cent of employees. In the other 
sectors, the extra coverage allowed by territorial deals is 5 per cent in manufacturing 
and business services and 12 per cent in personal services. Overall, it stands at 7 per 
cent, so that the combined coverage of second-level company and territorial agreements 
is 34 per cent (Fondazione Di Vittorio 2016: 8–10).
These data indicate a relatively low diɣ usion of decentralised agreements, with the 
partial exception of manufacturing. Even more importantly for our analysis, the 
extension of second-level agreements does not seem to have grown signi¿ cantly in 
recent decades. A previous ISTAT study on collective bargaining in the mid-1990s 
showed that company agreements were concluded at a slightly lower level of 10 per cent 
of ¿ rms with 10 employees or more, with coverage of some 40 per cent of workers in the 
same subgroups of ¿ rms, which roughly corresponds to the present estimation of 27 per 
cent of the whole workforce.
These two analyses diverge with regard to the distance between the manufacturing and 
service sectors. Whereas there were no substantial diɣ erences in the mid-1990s, now 
manufacturing industry seems more signi¿ cantly involved in decentralised bargaining 
(18 per cent of ¿ rms as opposed to around 10 per cent). It is hard to tell whether this 
is the result of the features of the two surveys or reÀ ects an increase in decentralised 
bargaining in manufacturing. Without further data and analysis, we cannot say whether 
there are clear signs of a general expansion of decentralised collective bargaining. 
Rather, in terms of coverage, sectoral agreements certainly remain the most important 
reference. Moreover, the use of derogations seems rather limited: 2 per cent of ¿ rms 
used them in 2012–2013, according to the CNEL-ISTAT survey (2016: 115). Similarly, 
the latest report of the observatory on decentralised bargaining maintained by the 
union confederation CISL indicates that derogations were included in 4 per cent of 
the agreements signed in 2015–2016 (OCSEL 2017: 10–11). In sum, the bargaining 
hierarchy does not seem to be radically challenged for the time being, also because 
decentralised bargaining has not eɣ ectively expanded its reach.
Among the countries included in this study, Spain’s collective bargaining system has 
probably been most aɣ ected by recent unilateral government initiatives. The substantial 
changes include the following: the prioritisation of decentralised agreements over 
sectoral deals, without reserving any topics to the latter; the shortening of the validity 
of collective agreements after their expiry; the possibility to engage in negotiations with 
non-union entities; and broader scope for employers to introduce unilateral changes in 
working conditions not regulated by mandatory collective bargaining agreements (see 
above). One of the main objectives of the new measures was to promote decentralised 
bargaining at the company level. Data show that particularly the 2012 reform may 
have succeeded in this, as the number of agreements rose in 2013, possibly also driven 
by the new expiration clause and therefore by the necessity to renew deals. Notably, 
the number of agreements concluded in newly established bargaining units went up 
signi¿ cantly in 2013 and this may reÀ ect eɣ orts to take advantage of the new rules on 
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derogations, among other things. Indeed, accords concluded in new company and group 
bargaining units almost doubled from 2012 to 2013 and then remained at a similar high 
level, which slightly decreased by 10 per cent each year until 2016, when they still stood 
40 per cent above the 2012 level. However, in terms of newly covered employees, the 
new agreements involved only some 0.5 per cent of total employees per year from 2012 
to 2016, with a 1 per cent peak in 2013.
Indeed, bargaining coverage rates remained relatively stable during the crisis, at 
around 65 per cent of total employees for agreements above the company level (if we 
take into consideration the share of total employment which is excluded from collective 
bargaining, we would get levels around 7–8 per cent higher; see Visser 2016)1 and about 
6 per cent for company agreements. In fact, the substantial loss of coverage from 2008 
until 2016 – around 1.5 million workers considering the agreements above the company 
level – roughly parallels the fall in the number of employees, which decreased by some 
1.6 million in the same period. Derogations from company agreements remained fairly 
stable between 2012 and 2016, covering around 0.3 per cent of total employees, with 
again a peak of 1 per cent in 2013. In part, the rise in new company-level bargaining 
units illustrated above and the use of derogations can be linked to the activation of 
negotiations in SMEs with non-union worker delegations, which led to derogatory deals 
(agreements ‘in pejus’). This practice remained limited, however, and it has also been 
challenged in court, due to the controversial legitimation of the bargaining party on 
the employee side (see the chapter on Spain for details). According to this evidence, we 
can say that, overall, the Spanish bargaining system, so far, has not been challenged 
substantially: sectoral agreements remain at the heart of the system, whereas the reach 
of company agreements is not expanding and the possibility for derogations is not used 
widely. One issue that remains underexplored is the utilisation of reinforced employer 
prerogatives to unilaterally modify the terms of employment, introduced by the 2012 
reform. If this kind of unilateral modi¿ cation expanded, the central role of collective 
bargaining as a regulatory tool may be threatened, especially in SMEs, where this 
practice could be a more attractive option than collectively agreed derogations.
2.3  Bargaining quality across levels: increasing scope for decentralised 
 agreements
A proper assessment of the quality and eɣ ectiveness of collective bargaining at the 
various levels would require a detailed analysis of the content of the diɣ erent agreements. 
This is certainly an important element of research on current developments in collective 
bargaining, but it goes beyond the objectives of this study. Here, we essentially want 
to consider whether recent changes have involved some degree of ‘hollowing out’ of 
1. The identi¿ cation of the bargaining coverage rate remains a controversial issue in Spain, due to diɣ erent 
methods to calculate it and the alleged limits of oɤ  cial statistics. Current estimates vary from 65 per cent up 
to as much as 90 per cent. Here, we stick to the oɤ  cial statistics provided by the Spanish Ministry of Labour 
(Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, Estadística de convenios colectivos de trabajo, http://www.empleo.
gob.es/estadisticas/cct/welcome.htm), for the number of covered workers, and to the Eurostat Labour Force 
Survey data (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database), as far as the number of employees is 
concerned.
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sectoral agreements and we can address this issue essentially by combining the two 
previous dimensions and using summary information on the issues addressed in 
decentralised agreements as opposed to sectoral deals.
In multi-tier bargaining systems the various levels of negotiations are complementary, 
but can also be in competition with one another. Vertical coordination is the 
institutional tool for regulating potential competition and assigning relative importance 
to the diɣ erent levels. Organised bargaining systems are often those where lower-
level negotiations take place in a framework set by higher-level agreements, which 
maintain a hierarchical prevalence. However, vertical coordination may also involve 
a substantial shift of competences from central to decentralised levels. Moreover, 
decentralised collective bargaining does not necessarily imply lower levels of protection 
for the workers involved. Against the background of full-employment, in the 1960s and 
1970s, important waves of decentralisation of collective bargaining were driven by the 
strength of union representation in workplaces, leading to important results in terms of 
pay rises, stronger protections and union prerogatives. As for the legal framework, the 
bargaining power of unions at decentralised level was often reinforced by the presence 
of a favourability principle, which ensured that second-level agreements could only 
enhance protections established at higher levels.
In recent years, the long-term shift of bargaining power in favour of employers driven by 
the internationalisation of markets and production was, on one hand, exacerbated by the 
impact of the economic crisis on growth and employment and, on the other, buttressed 
by a number of measures that eroded the role of sectoral/central collective bargaining. 
Some of these measures may eɣ ectively support a weakening of the regulatory role of 
sectoral agreements, starting from dismantling the favourability principle. The 2012 
reform enacted in Spain, as well as Article 8 of Decree 138 introduced by the Italian 
government in August 2011 provide for the possibility of extensive derogations by 
decentralised agreements under certain, broadly de¿ ned circumstances. Importantly, 
the Spanish regulation includes pay among the terms of employment that can be 
derogated, whereas the Italian rules do not. The recent ordonnances signed by President 
Macron in France on 22 September 2017 go in the same direction, although they provide 
that some fundamental topics remain reserved to sectoral deals, including basic wages. 
However, the very limited impact so far of the former measures in Italy and Spain 
suggests that there is no direct link between reforms and outcomes. The response of the 
social partners is fundamental and it can try to reinstate or con¿ rm the role of industry-
wide agreements. The conclusion of the ¿ rst national metalworking agreement in Spain 
in 2016 goes in this direction. Similarly, the Italian social partners have signed a number 
of intersectoral agreements aimed at establishing a clear framework for organised 
decentralisation, whose objective is to preserve the role of sectoral agreements and of 
the bargaining parties.
In Germany, where the issue of vertical coordination remains fully in the hands of 
the social partners, the system of opening clauses, as well as the practice of ‘informal 
derogations’ seem aɣ ect relations between bargaining levels. Indeed, the utilisation of 
opening clauses appears to be widespread and aɣ ects two major issues, working time 
and wages, often in the form of so-called pacts for employment and competitiveness, 
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whereby more À exibility is exchanged for job security and sometimes investment. In 
the case of the metalworking sector, for instance, the above-mentioned Pforzheim 
Agreement, with its general opening clause, provided solid ground for the diɣ usion of 
derogations, which currently involve around one-third of all companies covered by the 
sectoral agreement (2012–2014, source: IG Metall). In contrast, derogation agreements 
play only a minor role in the German retail trade, since employers largely favour 
disorganised decentralisation and have withdrawn from collective bargaining (see the 
chapter on Germany for more details).
Only Belgium seems to be insulated from this trend towards a possible erosion of the 
role of central agreements through derogations. There, the stability of the favourability 
principle remains a formal impediment to such developments. However, as indicated 
above, the shrinking scope for wage bargaining at central and sectoral level imposed by 
government intervention and con¿ rmed by the new 2017 law on collective bargaining, 
has shifted the attention of the social partners to the company level. This emerging 
trend may encourage the development of company bargaining outside the sectors where 
it was already the main bargaining level (the petro-chemical, chemical, banking, steel 
and paper industries).
Table 3 provides an overview of the current state of play concerning the importance 
of decentralised bargaining in the ¿ ve countries featured in this study. In Belgium, 
the role of company agreements has remained close to the traditional ‘distributive’ 
role. Derogations are possible only in certain very limited and highly regulated cases 
envisaged by sectoral agreements. Therefore, decentralised deals take place mainly 
in larger and better performing enterprises and provide for additional bene¿ ts and 
protections compared with sectoral and central deals. 
In the other countries, the scope and nature of company agreements is much broader. 
In Germany, we can ¿ nd the opening-clause system established and administered by 
the social partners at the sectoral level to speci¿ cally allow derogations. Nowadays, 
opening clauses are broadly used and cover important topics, so that the provisions of 
sectoral agreements can be regarded as de¿ ning a framework, which allows signi¿ cant 
adaptations at company level. Whether this amounts to an overall weakening of the 
regulatory framework or rather enables participation and union revitalisation at 
workplace level is still debated, with rather diɣ erent views in various sectors (see the 
chapter on Germany). In France, Italy and Spain, the most recent shifts to decentralised 
agreements were driven by government intervention, which was implemented either 
unilaterally or without social concertation agreements with the social partners. In some 
cases, reforms had to face the open opposition of at least parts of the union movement 
and some criticism also from the employers’ side. 
These recent changes in legislation have intervened in pre-existing decentralised 
bargaining systems, which show some signi¿ cant diɣ erences. In France, decentralised 
negotiations are well-developed and supported by legislative prerogatives; in Italy, 
they have a limited, but still relevant extension; in Spain, they seem to cover a fairly 
limited share of the workforce. In all cases, though, decentralised bargaining covers a 
wide range of topics and can enable adaptation to local conditions and support mutually 
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bene¿ cial exchanges, as in the case of pacts for employment and competitiveness in 
Germany (Addison et al. 2017).
The fact that, to date, utilisation of derogations is rather limited in all countries 
suggests at least two reÀ ections. First, the balance between sectoral agreements and 
decentralised deals has not changed yet and the former remain the principal reference 
for joint regulation of employment and working conditions. Second, the social partners 
Table 3 Main features of decentralised bargaining, 2016–2017
Favourability principle Diff usion of 
decentralised 
bargaining
Main topics of decentra-
lised bargaining
Current use of 
derogations
Belgium Yes, except very limited 
cases of opening clauses, 
strictly regulated by 
sectoral agreements
No data Additional bonuses and 
beneﬁ ts, working time 
arrangements, job classi-
ﬁ cation
Exceptional, 
almost non-
existent
France Thoroughly redeﬁ ned by 
recent Macron ordon-
nances, with limited topics 
reserved to sectoral agree-
ments (minimum wage 
rates, job classiﬁ cation 
systems, equality between 
women and men, training 
and so on)
High Wage supplements, 
working time, employ-
ment, proﬁ t sharing and 
participation
Very low, almost 
non-existent
Germany Yes, valid for works 
agreements.
Derogations possible 
only within procedural 
framework deﬁ ned at 
sectoral level for opening 
clauses
Medium Implementation of 
sectoral agreements and 
additional social beneﬁ ts 
introduced through works 
agreements. Derogation 
agreements on basis 
of opening clauses and 
informal derogation
Medium, mostly 
on working time 
and compensa-
tion (wages, al-
lowances, annual 
bonuses)
Italy No, broad derogations are 
possible for a wide range 
of reasons according to 
legislation. Basic wage 
rates cannot be aff ected. 
Intersectoral agreements 
deﬁ ned regulatory 
framework for the validity 
of derogatory accords
Medium Wage supplements, 
reorganisation and 
restructuring, welfare 
beneﬁ ts, working time, 
union prerogatives
Low, mostly on 
work organisa-
tion, working 
time, wage 
supplements, job 
classiﬁ cation
Spain Broad derogations are 
possible for a wide range 
of reasons according to 
legislation, which also 
strengthened employer 
prerogatives for unilateral 
changes in terms of 
employment. Decentra-
lised agreements can also 
derogate sectoral wage 
rates
Low Wage supplements, job 
classiﬁ cation, working 
time, employment, equal 
opportunities, training, 
complementary welfare, 
industrial relations
Low, mostly 
on wages and 
working hours
Source: DECOBA
Roberto Pedersini and Salvo Leonardi
28  Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries
seems quite cautious about taking up the possibilities oɣ ered by the new legislation. 
Multi-employer bargaining still represents a fundamental reference for unions and 
workers’ protections and employers seem to recognise its merits in terms of providing a 
level playing ¿ eld for competition and a common basis for building positive workplace 
industrial relations. It may only be a question of time, but, if this interpretation is valid, 
the ways in which decentralisation of bargaining structures has been implemented lately 
seem ill-conceived. Instead of supporting the renewal of workplace industrial relations, 
they jeopardise it. Careful monitoring of future developments in this area remains a key 
task for all industrial relations scholars and practitioners.
3.  The driving forces
The mapping of changes in our ¿ ve countries points to both commonalities and substantial 
diɣ erences. What are the factors that can explain the pattern of transformation that we 
have observed? As mentioned above, we are looking at a relatively short window of 
observation between 2012 and 2017, but we want to include a longer time span, with 
a view to understanding whether we are witnessing short-term or long-term eɣ ects. 
Short-term shocks may have an external origin, such as those entailed by the global 
¿ nancial and economic crisis that broke in the second half of the 2000s. However, they 
are always mediated by the internal situation and addressed by domestic actors, so that 
disentangling ‘external’ and ‘internal’ factors can be diɤ  cult, if not impossible. Here, 
we identify some variables that have been used to explain developments in industrial 
relations and, more generally, in the variance of structural reforms implemented in 
the EU in recent years. From a more qualitative perspective, we will try to identify the 
processes and agency that have shaped the patterns we have identi¿ ed.
These are the short-term variables that we have considered:
– economic growth, as an indicator of the economic conditions of enterprises;
– exports, as a measure of the external competitive pressure on enterprises;
– employment and unemployment, as indicators of the balance of power between 
workers and employers;
– public debt and de¿ cit, as a measure of vulnerability and exposure within the EU;
– country-speci¿ c recommendations, in order to consider the inÀ uence of the EU 
governance framework;
– agency of governments and social partners, which represents the mediation of the 
other variables.
Table 4 shows that the ¿ ve countries under examination have been aɣ ected by the 
¿ nancial and economic crisis to quite diɣ erent degrees. 
Spain suɣ ered the largest decline in output, which remained below the pre-crisis period 
in 2016. During the crisis, employment decreased by almost 3.5 million, more than 15 
per cent below the pre-crisis level, and it was still below that level by 11 per cent in 2016. 
The unemployment rate rose to 26 per cent and in 2016 it was still 11 percentage points 
higher than the pre-crisis level. Its ¿ nancial vulnerability increased dramatically: Spain 
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entered the crisis with the lowest debt, but indebtedness increased almost threefold 
during it, while the de¿ cit was higher than in the other four countries and was highest 
of all in 2016. 
At the other end of the spectrum, we have Germany. The recovery was strong; the fall in 
GDP was not insigni¿ cant, but growth resumed rapidly and in 2016 GDP surpassed the 
pre-crisis level by almost 9 per cent. Employment performance has been particularly 
strong. The loss of jobs during the crisis was relatively limited, at 1.4 per cent of the 
pre-crisis level. In 2016, the unemployment rate had almost halved compared with pre-
crisis levels and Germany was the only case among our ¿ ve countries where it was lower 
than before the crisis. Both debt and de¿ cit increased during the crisis, but the debt has 
now almost gone back to the initial level, while in 2016 a surplus was achieved.
The other three countries lie between these two extremes, with Belgium closer to 
Germany in terms of economic and employment performance, but with a higher 
vulnerability in terms of public ¿ nances. Belgium is also the country with the highest 
ratio of exports to GDP, which makes it particularly sensitive to external competition 
issues and therefore very attentive to price dynamics, as the laws on competition clearly 
Table 4 Economic indicators during the crisis, 2007–2016a
GDP volumesb Exportsc Debtc Deﬁ citc
Min 2016 2016 Min Max 2016 Max Mean 2016
EU28 95.6 105.1 44.1 57.6 86.7 83.5 –6.6 –3.6 –1.7
EA19 95.5 103.0 45.9 65.0 92.0 89.2 –6.3 –3.2 –1.5
Belgium 97.7 106.6 84.5 87.0 106.7 105.9 –5.4 –3.0 –2.6
Germany 94.4 108.7 46.1 63.7 81.0 68.3 –4.2 –0.7 0.8
Spain 91.1 98.6 32.9 35.6 100.4 99.4 –11.0 –6.6 –4.5
France 97.1 105.1 29.3 64.3 96.0 96.0 –7.2 –4.5 –3.4
Italy 91.4 93.2 29.8 99.8 132.6 132.6 –5.3 –3.1 –2.4
  
Employment (‘000) Unemployment (%)
Max Reduction Reduc-
tion/
pre-crisisd
2016/
pre-crisise
Max Mean 2016 2016 -
pre-crisisf
EU28 224,173.2 7,453.7 3.3 0.6 11.0 9.3 8.7 1.6
EA19 146,758.6 6,089.0 4.1 –0.5 12.1 10.2 10.2 2.7
Belgium 4,586.7 25.2 0.6 3.2 8.6 7.9 7.9 0.9
Germany 41,267.3 548.1 1.4 7.1 8.8 6.2 4.2 –3.4
Spain 20,579.9 3,440.9 16.7 –10.9 26.2 19.7 19.7 11.4
France 26,583.8 252.0 1.0 2.5 10.4 9.2 10.1 3.0
Italy 23,090.3 899.8 3.9 –1.4 12.9 9.8 11.9 5.7
Notes: a) best performance among the ﬁ ve countries in italics, worst performance among the ﬁ ve countries in bold; 
b) 100=2008, 2007 for Italy; c) % of GDP; d) %; e) % change; f) percentage point change.
Source: Eurostat 2017.
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indicate. Italy is closer to Spain in many respects, with a poor economic and employment 
performance. In particular, Italy lags behind most in terms of recovery. It also presents 
the weakest position in public ¿ nance. France has done relatively well in promoting 
economic recovery, as well as job hoarding and job creation. It has a more vulnerable 
situation in public ¿ nance and relatively high unemployment rates.
It is often asserted that EU economic governance exerts a signi¿ cant pressure on 
national industrial relations systems and especially collective bargaining institutions 
(see Bongelli in this volume). Taking a mainstream economic approach, the link between 
wages and productivity has been emphasised in EU recommendations as a means to 
foster price competitiveness. Institutions promoting the establishment of wage À oors, 
such as legal minimum wages, indexation mechanisms and extension procedures have 
been regarded by mainstream economists with suspicion, as sources of ‘rigidity’ and 
potentially detrimental to employment. The ¿ ve countries under examination have been 
involved in the review cycle of domestic policies embodied in the so-called ‘European 
Semester’ and have received a number of Country-speci¿ c Recommendations (CSRs) on 
wage-setting and labour market institutions. It should be noted, however, that the areas 
covered by such recommendations are broad, whereas we focus on only a subset. In 
addressing recommendations, national governments can, to be sure, select strategically 
and progress in one area may reduce the pressure on others. In the system as a whole, 
‘the Commission is responsible for the analysis and the monitoring it performs, the 
Council is accountable for the recommendations issued … the national governments 
still are to be considered responsible for the policies implemented in their own country’ 
(Bongelli in this volume, p. 264). Although governments retain ¿ nal responsibility 
for their policies, the EU governance framework involves national governments in a 
monitoring and peer review system, which makes policymakers more accountable for 
their initiatives.
Suggestions to introduce ‘structural reforms’ to make the labour market more ‘À exible’, 
better align wages and productivity and make wage-setting more adaptable to local 
conditions have been included in the recommendations addressed to a number of 
countries, including all those under review here. Germany is a partial exception, 
because it imposed comprehensive labour market deregulation well before the crisis 
and its currently good economic and employment performance has reduced monitoring 
pressure, although, among other things, indications for reducing the tax wedge and, most 
notably, to instigate wage growth to support domestic demand have been put forward. 
It should also be noted that many of these recommendations have been reiterated a 
number of times, which may be regarded as an indication of their low eɣ ectiveness, as 
well as of the room to manoeuvre that national governments retain (Marginson and 
Welz 2014). This was the case, for instance, with regard to wage indexation mechanisms 
for Belgium, whose revision was repeatedly suggested in the EU reviews. However, 
reiteration and vulnerability in terms of budgetary imbalances may lead to adoption, 
especially if this can help obtain more À exibility in the assessment of public budget 
developments. The reforms introduced by Italy, France, Spain and Belgium aɣ ecting 
collective bargaining have in fact been acknowledged by EU institutions in their periodic 
review of national policies, although sometimes with concerns about their eɣ ectiveness 
and implementation (as in the case of Spain). 
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It is probably not by chance that the major formal interventions in industrial relations 
and collective bargaining can be found in the countries with the more critical economic 
and budgetary conditions, and we should not forget that Spain also received European 
¿ nancial support to recapitalise its ¿ nancial sector between July 2012 and January 2014. 
However, the changes in institutional frameworks should be seen in terms of the 
interaction between the national and supra-national levels, with governments as key 
actors, especially because of the need to handle the impact of the economic and ¿ nancial 
crisis on domestic economies and labour markets. Spain and France introduced 
important provisions aɣ ecting industrial relations. Italy, which remains in a fragile 
economic and budgetary situation, did not fully follow in the same direction. Important 
and incisive reforms have been imposed on the pension system in late 2011 and the 
labour market since 2012, accommodating EU policy recommendations. However, 
industrial relations were not subjected to far-reaching reforms, with the fundamental 
– if one-oɣ  – exception of Article 8 of Decree Law 138/2011, when the Berlusconi 
government received a letter from the ECB suggesting decentralisation of the bargaining 
system. This relative preservation of social partner autonomy in regulating key elements 
of the collective bargaining system can probably be linked to the voluntarist tradition 
of Italian industrial relations and notably to the eɣ orts of the Italian social partners, 
who have been intensively negotiating on the issues of representation and collective 
bargaining structure since 2011. They achieved important results, as the single text on 
representation of January 2014 shows, but the diɤ  culties faced in implementing their 
agreements may lead to some form of legislative intervention, which could now receive 
broad support, especially if it enacted the results of bilateral negotiations.
Belgium also received substantial recommendations within the EU governance system, 
but it did not change the structure of collective bargaining or, for instance, abandon 
the wage indexation system adopted in collective agreements. Like Italy, the main 
reforms arising from interaction with the EU institutions on social policy concerned 
pensions and the ¿ scal system, including the tax wedge. True, the government took 
central wage-setting under stricter control, imposed a wage freeze in 2013–2014 and 
temporarily abolished the wage indexation mechanism in 2015–2016. However, in 
this it followed a policy orientation established in the late 1980s, with the ¿ rst law on 
competitiveness, which may be linked to the openness of Belgium’s domestic economy.
Germany, despite its positive short-term performance in growth and employment, as 
well as the lack of signi¿ cant pressure on industrial relations from the EU economic 
governance framework, has undergone a signi¿ cant transformation with regard to 
collective bargaining. Indeed, changes in the German bargaining system are no less 
substantial than in the other countries. In fact, the cuts in the coverage of sectoral 
agreements and the increasing role of company-level bargaining in derogating sectoral 
standards may be interpreted as announcing more radical transformations in the future. 
Policy responses have, indeed, gone in the direction of providing more coordination, 
especially at horizontal level, through the introduction of the legal minimum wage in 
January 2015 and the provision of more possibilities to extend collective agreements.
In sum, our case studies clearly show that, besides national governments within the EU 
policy framework, the role of the social partners is of the utmost importance. Not only 
are national policies set domestically, in which the social partners play an important 
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role, but the eɣ ectiveness of legislative interventions is mediated by the strategies 
and initiatives implemented by the social partners, both jointly and individually. 
Germany is probably the example closest to the general picture of long-term changes 
in collective bargaining driven by developments in bilateral industrial relations, 
within a changing economic and institutional framework. The diɣ erences that we can 
discern in the structure of collective bargaining in the chemicals, metalworking and 
service sectors, with the signi¿ cant exception of retail, are indicative of the importance 
of speci¿ c features of the various sectors. Sectors play an important role everywhere 
(Bechter et al. 2011), but in this case the weakening of horizontal coordination and the 
lack of an encompassing formal regulatory framework has probably emphasised the 
role of sectoral social partners. The other countries provide diɣ erent examples of the 
role of social partners: the ‘enrichment’ of decentralised bargaining linked to stricter 
legal wage norms in Belgium; the importance that Spanish employers, especially 
SMEs, still attach to sectoral agreements at provincial level; the results obtained by 
Spanish unions in supporting the role of multi-employer bargaining within the new 
legislative framework; the limited impact so far of the rules enabling derogations in 
France; and the similarly low diɣ usion of derogations and social partner commitment 
to autonomously de¿ ning the rules of collective bargaining in Italy. These examples all 
indicate the substantial autonomy of industrial relations systems, even when external 
government interventionism endangers their independence.
4.  Concluding remarks: the way forward through troubled waters
In this ¿ nal section, we can go back to our initial questions: was the recent crisis a 
turning point for EU industrial relations? What remains after the ‘frontal assault’ on 
multi-employer bargaining? What kind of industrial relations are now being advanced 
by the new EU policy climate, which aims to revitalise social dialogue?
The analysis of our ¿ ve country cases, summarised in Table 5, suggests some tentative 
answers. Multi-employer bargaining has been under pressure in recent years through 
the impact of the ¿ nancial and economic crisis and government interventions in 
areas traditionally within the remit of social partner autonomy. Such pressure on 
collective bargaining systems has impacted both their structure – notably the degree 
of coordination between diɣ erent bargaining levels and across bargaining units – and 
their outcomes, leading especially to wage restraint and internal devaluation, as well as 
to more concession bargaining, namely at company level.
The space for decentralised bargaining increased almost everywhere, including in 
Belgium, where the bargaining system remains strongly organised. In France, Italy and 
Spain, legal reforms have subverted the traditional bargaining hierarchy established 
by previous legislation or collective agreements, thereby favouring decentralised agree-
ments over sectoral ones. In some countries, such weakening of vertical coordination 
may, in the future, involve a substantial erosion of multi-employer bargaining and, 
in certain cases, could lead to disorganised bargaining and even the dismantling of 
collective bargaining institutions.
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Some national collective bargaining systems have been aɣ ected by an increasing variety 
of bargaining units with diɣ erent levels of protection (segmentation) and a tendency 
towards a decline of collective bargaining coverage (de-collectivisation). Germany is a 
case in point, while Italy and – partly – Belgium show emerging signs of segmentation. It 
should be underlined that segmentation often results in lower protection and therefore 
represents a possible alternative to decentralised derogations, especially where the 
prevalence of sectoral agreements in uncontested, as in Belgium.
The increasing government intervention in industrial relations and collective bargaining 
issues is reducing bargaining autonomy in the countries under review. In some cases, 
government intervention aims to directly aɣ ect the bargaining structure or outcomes, 
as in France, Italy and Spain, by supporting the prevalence of decentralised agreements, 
or in Belgium with stricter wage norms and the imposition of temporary wage freezes. 
In Germany, by contrast, the introduction of the legal minimum wage in 2015 and the 
reinforcement of extension mechanisms have gone some way towards counteracting the 
weakening of the general regulatory capacity of industrial relations. 
In sum, the crisis was accompanied by a number of policy-driven changes, especially 
in the countries most aɣ ected by the economic downturn and more exposed in terms 
of public ¿ nance vulnerability, and reinforced the tendency towards segmentation. 
However, our analysis indicates that no systemic changes in collective bargaining 
structure have yet taken place.
Table 5 Breaking through the crisis: current trends in collective bargaining
Bargaining structure Coverage Bargained derogations
Coordination Autonomy Sectoral Decentralised Scope Use
Belgium Organised 
bargaining
Decreasing 
in horizontal 
coordination
High (stable) No data 
(Increasing)
None, very 
limited
Not applicable
France Decentralised 
bargaining
Decreasing 
in vertical 
coordination
High (stable) Increasing Broad, with 
limitations
Low
Germany Organised 
bargaining
Decreasing 
in horizontal 
coordination
Declining 
(partial de-col-
lectivisation)
Medium 
(stable)
Broad, with 
procedural 
rules
Medium 
(increasing)
Italy Organised 
bargaining/
decentra-
lised and 
segmented 
bargaining?
Threatened 
in vertical 
coordination
High (stable) Medium 
(stable)
Broad Low
Spain Decentralised 
bargaining/
disorganised 
bargaining?
Decreasing 
in vertical 
coordination
High (stable) Low (stable) Broad Low
Source: DECOBA.
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Indeed, a number of elements signal the resilience of national employment relations, 
which essentially derives from the autonomous institutions of industrial relations 
and the actions of the social partners. National social partners on both sides seem to 
consider joint regulation, including at central and sectoral levels, as an asset which 
must be preserved.
The scant utilisation of the derogations newly allowed by legislation in France, Italy 
and Spain suggests that, so far, the local bargaining parties do not consider them a 
useful tool, despite the support that employers often gave these reforms in national 
political debates. Possibly this limited implementation may be linked to the disruptive 
potential that derogations could play, especially on existing workplace industrial 
relations, which were established in a regulatory framework that was more conducive 
to mutually bene¿ cial deals. Leaving aside exceptional circumstances, in fact, there is 
no guarantee that recourse to disadvantageous (to workers) derogations would help 
company performance, especially in the medium-to-long term, while they can certainly 
corrode commitment, trust and cooperation in the workplace.
However, it is important to underline that the reforms introduced during the crisis 
have increased the number of options available to employers, thereby reinforcing their 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the unions, and have sometimes directly strengthened the 
employers’ unilateral prerogatives to modify employment terms and conditions. These 
new ‘exit strategies’ from collective bargaining contribute to weakening the regulatory 
capacity of industrial relations and may erode the importance of collective bargaining 
in the future.
Our case studies expose the policy failures that characterise the ways in which the crisis 
was addressed in the European Union. Austerity measures were particularly severe 
where the economic downturn and budgetary fragility were most pronounced. Despite 
the policymakers’ expectations, austerity did not lead to fast and strong recovery. 
Spain and Italy still lagged behind in 2016 in terms of economic and employment 
performance. Decentralisation ‘by decree’ was similarly ineɣ ective. There are no signs 
of lasting growth with regard to decentralised agreements in France, Italy and Spain, 
nor of signi¿ cant use of the opportunities for derogations.
Similarly, autonomous action by the social partners is subject to a number of limitations. 
In Italy, almost 25 years of eɣ orts to support decentralised bargaining as a means 
of promoting productivity and growth, as well as higher wages and better working 
conditions, have achieved meagre results. In Germany, the fully autonomous system 
of opening clauses could not stop either the decline in collective bargaining coverage at 
sectoral level or the emergence of important segments of the economy with very little 
union presence and collective bargaining, if any.
The new policy climate at EU level, therefore, ¿ nds the national systems of industrial 
relations somewhat under strain, or in troubled waters. The double weakness of policy 
initiatives and autonomous action in industrial relations, when taken alone, con¿ rms 
the importance of a combination of supportive legal institutions and autonomous 
industrial relations (Bordogna and Cella 1999). If they proceed along diverging paths, 
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the potential of industrial relations for growth and social cohesion, which is recognised 
and supported by the EU institutions, can be wasted.
In this perspective, horizontal coordination of collective bargaining is becoming a key 
issue, if we want to ¿ ght inequality and promote decent terms of employment and 
working conditions across our economies and in the EU. This may entail more policy 
and legal interventions than in the past to enforce minimum standards and promote the 
integrative role of collective bargaining.
Decentralisation is a long-term trend in collective bargaining, which pre-dates the crisis 
and whose prospects depend on its capacity to meet the expectations of both bargaining 
parties. The policy option of opening up room for derogations does not seem to go in this 
direction. Instead, decentralisation requires substantial institutional support, of which 
horizontal and vertical coordination are essential components, in order to avoid the risks 
of a low-protection/low-productivity trap, with growing disorganisation, segmentation 
and de-collectivisation. In particular, it is important to frame decentralised bargaining 
in a regulatory system that fosters workers’ protections and productivity, by supporting 
wages as a key element of growth rather than a cost. Multi-tier bargaining systems 
may in this way combine the inclusiveness of multi-employer agreements with the 
responsiveness and adaptability of decentralised deals.
Industrial relations institutions at all levels are valuable assets that promote trust and 
cooperation in the workplace. Social partners appear to be clearly aware of this and show 
great caution in handling new legal rules that might endanger established institutions. 
Policies that fully recognise and support the autonomy of the social partners and 
their joint regulatory systems are a necessary element of any initiatives which aim to 
be eɣ ective and fully exploit the potential inherent in industrial relations for growth 
and social cohesion. Balancing a more incisive role for the state with support for social 
partner autonomy is the challenge that lies ahead.
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